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ABSTRACT 
The suggestion that public private partnerships (P3s) allow for an optimal transfer 
of risk is pervasive in P3 literature, yet there is very little research that investigates the 
impact of risk transfer on sustainability. Because P3s are typically long-term contracts, 
they are by nature exposed to a high level of risk and uncertainty. As a result of this 
exposure and the lack of information that exists regarding risk transfer in Canadian P3s, 
the question arose as to whether there exists model of risk transfer that leads to greater 
sustainability. 
A literature review was completed to determine whether or not a recommended 
model of risk transfer exists. This literature review focused on the compilation of data 
primarily from Australian and United Kingdom sources, due to the longer period of 
experience with P3s in those jurisdictions. A recommended risk transfer model was 
developed. 
To determine whether or not methods of risk transfer in Canada follow this 
model, information regarding risk and risk transfer was collected through contact with 
key senior personnel having involvement in a range of Canadian P3 projects. These 
participants represented projects over ten industry sectors, several Provinces, and 
included projects that involved various levels of government. The information provided 
by the participants was collated and compared to the recommended risk transfer model. 
The data identified that although 35% of the projects studied did follow the 
recommended risk transfer model, 65% of the projects did not follow the model. 
However, only 9% of projects studied failed, leading to the conclusion that there are 
many different risk models that lead to the success and sustainability of Canadian P3 
projects. 
Further, there is a requirement to address the unique needs and characteristics of 
each model in order to allocate risk in a manner that maximizes the chance of the 
project's ability to sustain over the duration of the partnership contract. 
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INTRODUCTION TO P3s 
Overview 
Public private partnerships, commonly referred to as "P3s", are models for 
providing infrastructure and/or services by combining the strengths of both the public and 
private sector. Many different definitions of P3s exist. As defined by the Canadian 
Council for Public Private Partnerships (CCPPP), a P3 is "a cooperative venture between 
the public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner that best meets 
clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and 
rewards". Industry Canada defines the P3 as "a legal arrangement between two or more 
parties who have agreed to work collaboratively towards shared or compatible objectives 
and in which there is shared authority and responsibility, joint investment of resources, 
allocated or shared liability and risk-taking, and mutual benefits". Partnerships British 
Columbia defines P3s as "a legally binding contract between government and business 
for the provision of assets and the delivery of services". In many situations, involvement 
in a P3 moves the public sector from being a direct provider of services, to being a 
procurer of services (24 ). 
Variation in P3 Models 
Figure 1 is a visual representation of the spectrum of public and private sector 
involvement. This spectrum ranges from strictly government-provided services (bottom 
left), to complete privatization (top right). The more private involvement relative to 
public involvement, the closer the P3 is towards the fully privatized end of the spectrum, 
and vice versa. Figure 1 is not a complete list of the various models of P3s that exist, and 
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is included only to convey the idea that P3s exist in many different forms, and involve 
different degrees of public and private sector involvement. A P3 could include any 
combination of public and private involvement in the design, build, finance, and 
operation tasks involved with the provision of facilities and/or services. 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Public Private Partnership Models 
Source: Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships 
The "contracting-out" relationship is the foundation of the P3, and is not a new 
concept. For example, traditional contracting out of construction could be a government 
retaining a construction company to build a recreation centre. In this case, the contractor 
is simply the builder and is not involved in the recreation centre in any capacity that 
extends beyond its construction. Traditional contracting involves. little transfer of 
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responsibility and control, and limited involvement of the contracted party in decision-
making. In this respect P3s have been in existence for quite some time, as there are many 
examples of a public entity contracting out services. However, the past 10 years has seen 
this traditional contracting relationship change so that the contractor may now be 
involved in a much more significant manner. 
Recent P3 Developments in Canada 
The specific elements that characterize recent P3 development in Canada are 
1) contracting out a larger number of the tasks 
2) the allocation of two or more of those tasks to a consortium of partners 
3) allocation of the financing task to the private partner (34) 
These elements have changed the traditional contracting-out relationship. In the 
traditional contract relationship there is minimal long-term involvement, and the 
contractor is not an active investor in the development of the project. However, by 
contracting out a larger number of the tasks to a consortium partnership, participants may 
take an interest in aspects of the project that traditional contracting would ignore. 
For example, if the public partner contracts with a private partner to design, build, 
operate, and finance the facility, the private partner is involved for a longer period of time 
and has an ongoing financial investment in the project. 
Also, the consortium partnership is able to take advantage of their specialized 
expertise and realize efficiencies that may not be possible if each member were to work 
independently of one another. For example, an engineering firm, a construction 
company, a service provider and a financial services firm may join forces and form a 
consortium to partner with the public body. Rather than a traditional linear allocation of 
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tasks, this consortium can now bundle these tasks together and provide opportunities for 
collaboration that create efficiencies between the various project tasks. 
Table 1 further outlines some of the differences between traditional outsourcing, 
and a partnership model of service delivery. 
Table 1: A Comparison of Out-tasking and Partnering 
Out-task ing Partnering 
• Typically involves farming out d iscrete • Compre h e nsive s e rvice del ivery 
ta s k s or services w h ich could include a strea m or 
• No change in culture is required by entire line of business 
the public sector organiz ation • Change In culture Is required 
• C a n help le v e l peak and v a lleys in • P a rtne rship relationship 
w orkload • C lient & s e rvice provid e w ork 
• C lient-supplie r re lationship coHa borativ e 
• Client d irects the w o rk of the supplier • Integ ration of syste ms a nd 
processes 
• Limited to no Integ ration of s y stems • R isk t ransfere nce 
or p roce s ses • Long-te rm arrange m e nt 
• Limited to no risk transference • Must Include m e cha n is ms for 
• Short- te rm arra nge m e nt change a nd more difficult to c a nce l 
• Eas ily cha nge d or cance lle d • Control on the uWHAT" is b e ing 
• Control on "HOW" the w ork is b e in g done 
done • F ocus on p e rforma nce a nd 
• M a n a g e m e nt Intensive a ppro pria te m o n itoring 
Source: P3 Public Sector Readiness Assessment Guide, Industry Canada 2003 
Though these new developments in P3 practices are already fairly established in 
the UK, New Zealand and Australia, they only began to emerge in Canada in the mid 
1990s. Some of the more high profile P3s in Canada include the Confederation Bridge 
( 1999), the 407 Electronic Toll Road in Southern Ontario ( 1998), and the Charles wood 
Bridge in Winnipeg (1995). 
Although P3 infrastructure projects have gathered more public attention, P3s can 
also include provision of services that do not involve capital projects such as data 
management and road maintenance. Table 2 identifies 100 P3s by sector, that occurred in 
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Canada between 1998-2001, which include among others, airports, education, healthcare, 
recreation, and transportation projects. 
Table 2: 
100 P3's in Canada 1998-2001 
Percentage of Projects 13% 8% 
Source: Public Private Partnerships in Canada: Successes, Opportunities and Challenges, 2004 
Canada's political structure involves three levels of government (federal, 
provincial and municipal), each of which is free to develop its own processes and 
procedures for establishing P3 structures (38). Although some provinces have developed 
organizations to develop P3 expertise and support best practices (Partnerships BC is an 
example), Canadian P3s are largely assessed on a case-by-case basis. Without a 
centralized framework or set of guidelines, Canada has many structures and uses many 
approaches to P3 development. Despite the lack of regulatory support in Canada 
5 
(although the development of more P3 organizations has helped to 1mprove this 
situation), the push to pursue P3s continues. 
The Push Toward P3s 
There is great pressure for increased services, and infrastructure development in 
Canada. For example, healthcare, transportation systems, and recreation facilities are all 
in high demand. Though it is difficult and sometimes controversial to estimate the exact 
infrastructure deficit in Canada, researchers have estimated it to be between 50 and 125 
billion dollars (5). Results of a national survey conducted by the CCPPP (36) show that 
more than 8 in 10 Canadians believe that all 3 levels of government are having difficulty 
keeping pace with the demand for public infrastructure and services (see Figure 2). 
As well, there is increased pressure to improve service delivery, and meet the 
ever-changing needs of the Canadian population. In response to these pressures, 
governments are searching for ways to meet this demand despite their limited budgets. 
For example, llcan et al (7) have determined that lease-back arrangements with private 
capital repaid over 30 years (a hypothetical time frame), avoid immediate increases in 
taxes and don't increase the public sector borrowing requirement. They argue that 
governments have essentially become consumers of private industry due to pressures that 
require more and more flexibility to promote the efficiency and competitiveness required 
in today's global marketplace (7). Due to these pressures, governments are continuously 
looking to alternative service delivery methods that "improve the delivery of government 
services to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community groups, 
and other entities" (7). It is also worth noting that P3s are highly compatible with the 
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user-pay concept where project costs are borne by users rather than more general forms 
of taxation. 
Figure 2: Results of a National Survey on Canadian Infrastructure Deficit 
More than eight out of ten Canadians believe that their national, provincial and 
municipal governments are having trouble keeping pace with the demand for new or 
improved public infrastructure - roads, hospitals, schools, public transit systems, power 
stations, water and wastewater treatment facilities and so on. 
100 ~-----------------------------------------------
80 
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20 
0 
Canada Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairies B.C. 
The concept of the "infrastructure deficit" resonates across the board, from British 
Columbia to the Maritimes, regardless of the whether people live in a city, town or rural 
area and irrespective of the political party they support- Liberal, Conservative, NDP or 
Bloc Quebecois (see below). 
100 ~-----------------------------------------------
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Source: The People Speak on P3, CCPPP 2004 
The Promise of P3s 
The primary argument m support of P3s is that "value for money" can be 
achieved through leveraging private sector competencies, and allocating the risks 
involved to the party that is best able to manage this risk (40) . Value for money is 
determined by comparing the lifetime cost of infrastructure/service provision if provided 
entirely by the public sector, to the lifetime cost of providing the infrastructure/service 
through a combination of public and private sector partnership. 
The argument behind P3s is that the public's value for money over the lifecycle of 
the project can be enhanced by combining the strengths of both public and private 
sectors. Life cycle costing refers to the consideration of costs incurred throughout the 
duration of the project's life span or contract period. Life cycle costs can be reduced by 
partnering because the public sector is able to take advantage of the private sector's 
specialized expertise, productivity, efficiency, economies of scale and flexibility. 
The British Columbia Guide for Local Government (23) summarizes that the 
"underlying logic for establishing partnerships is that both the public and the private 
sector have unique characteristics that provide them with advantages in specific aspects 
of service or project delivery- the most successful partnership arrangements draw on the 
strengths of both the public and private sector to establish complementary relationships". 
For example, the private sector can offer efficiencies such as economies of scale, and 
development and use of innovative technologies that can improve the quality and level of 
services while at the same time reduce the costs of providing the services. Further 
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benefits can result from increased employment and growth, thus achieving even greater 
value for money. 
The Opposition to P3s 
However, P3s and their claims do not exist without criticism. Among all 
arguments against P3s, a loss of government control is perhaps most often cited. The 
sharing of decision-making between partners leads to concern regarding which partner 
controls the delivery of service (22). ill-thought partnership agreements result in 
confusion and unclear lines of responsibility. However, this potential exists in any 
partnership arrangement and cannot be isolated to a P3 structure. 
Opponents of P3s also cite poor accountability in comparison to conventional 
service delivery, which then leads to mistrust and skepticism of the public's ability to 
fulfill its mandate and respond to the needs and demands of its citizens. It is argued that 
if a limited number of private partners respond to a Request for Proposals, the lack of 
competition will instill doubt that services can be provided at the optimum value for 
money. Further, if a bias in the selection process is perceived this will only increase 
public mistrust. 
As described by De Bettignies and Ross (34), many P3 critics are public sector 
unions who view P3s as an attempt by the public sector to shift work to private sector 
firms which then offer lower compensation, and thus an inferior quality of service. 
Despite the critics of P3s, the results of a 2004 national survey on attitude 
conducted by the CCPPP (an organization run by both public and private 
representatives), claim that 6 out of 10 people agree it is time to allow the private sector 
to deliver services in partnership with the public sector (36). 
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P3s and Sustainability 
P3 contracts have varied between 5-40 years in duration period. However the 
current trend is towards a contract period of 15-35 years. The duration of a project 
agreement will depend on a number of factors such as the anticipated length of 
service/operational life, the period for which the service is required, and how changeable 
is the required technology (22). 
Due to the increasing number of tasks the private partner assumes m a P3 
relationship, contract periods are often based on the timeline required in order for 
partners to realize a return on their investment. In a design/build project the return on 
investment may be realized in the relatively brief time it takes to design and build the 
project, and the time associated with terms of warranty. However, in a 
design/build/operate project it may take the duration of a 30 year contract before the 
desired return on investment can be achieved by either party. 
Thus, it is essential that the project remain sustainable for the duration of the 
contract period. 
There are two elements considered when defining "sustainability" of a P3: the 
project itself must be sustainable to ensure that the desired infrastructure and/or service is 
provided to the public, and the partnership must endure to ensure that the service 
outcomes and financial returns desired by each party are achieved. Given that the 
maintenance of the P3 structure requires both the partnership and the project to endure, 
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all further reference to sustainability refers to the ability of the infrastructure/service as 
well as the partnership relationship to last for the duration of the contract period. 
For the purposes of this paper, sustainability is used as the primary measure of P3 
success. 
Although the Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships recognizes many 
P3 projects that are leaders in innovation and are very successful, not all P3 projects have 
been sustainable. Proposed P3 projects have been discontinued during the process of 
negotiation, and existing P3 projects have failed several years into the partnership 
contract. The Ontario Health Coalition, supported by the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, has published a report titled "Flawed, Failed, Abandoned", which cites 100 
P3 projects that have not succeeded, or are flawed. Though the information provided in 
the publication is quite limited, many projects cited describe P3s that have provided poor 
value for money, involved managerial conflict between partners that prevented adequate 
project management, and involved labour conflict issues that hampered the quality and 
effectiveness of service provision. 
RISK AND P3s 
Overview 
Inherent in all projects is risk. Project risk refers to circumstances that have a 
negative effect on the benefits the project expects to gain (22). 
Changes in labour demographics, market demand, future funding levels, political 
power, and global competition are examples of risk that can have a negative effect on 
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projected benefits, especially when projections are made for extended periods of time, as 
in many P3 projects. Table 3 presents many different types of risks that could be faced in 
a project. P3 projects can involve many combinations of risk depending on their nature 
and the level of partnership involvement. 
Table 3: Examples of Project Risk 
Types of Project Ri k 
onstruction 1isk 
The ri~k tl1at the onstn1 tion of the physi al a sets is not ompl ted on 
time. to budget and to specification. 
Demand (usage) risk The risk that demand for the service is lower than planned 
Design risk 
The tisk that the de~i2ll annot deliver the sen·ices at the required 
perfonuance or quality ~tandards in the output specifications. 
The risks that the proje t could have au ad\-erse environmental impact 
Environmental risk whi h affe t project o t~ not fore een in the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) 
Fin an ia I risk 
The risk that the plivate se tor over~tre~ses a project by inappropliate 
fmaucial stmctming. 
An tmanti ipated mmatm-al or nanu·al disaster su h as war. eruthquake 
Fot e majeure tisk or flood of su b magnitude that it delays or destroys the project ru1d 
cannot be mitiJZated 
Inflation ri <>k The risk that actual inflation differs from assumed inflation rates 
The risk that h n~ es in Je islation increase costs. This an be sub-
Legislative risk dhided into general tisks su h as changes in corporate tax rates and 
specific ones which may disc1iminate against P3 projects. 
Maintenance risk 
The risk that the costs of keeping the assets in good ondition \ 'Ill)' from 
bud2et. 
Occupancy risk The risk that a property will remain untenanted - a fonu of demru1d risk. 
Operational risk 
The tisk that operatin~ co ts vary from budget. that petfonuan e 
standards slip or that the sen·ice cannot be provided as per output specs. 
The tisk that the implementation of a project fails to adhere to the temlS 
Planning 1isk of planning pennission. or that detailed planning crumot be obtained. or. 
if obtained. can only be implemented at costs greater than in the ori ina! 
budget. 
Policy risk The risk of chru1ges of policy direction not involving legislation. 
Residual \'alue risk The 1isk relating to the tmcertainty of the \"alue of physical assets at the 
end of the contract . 
Te hnology risk The ri k that hanges in teclmolo3 result in servi ces being provided 
usimt non optimal teclu10logy. 
Vohm1e Risk The risk that ach.Ial usae:e of the ser\"ice \"<Hies from the level foreca<>t. 
Source: The Public Sector Comparator, Industry Canada, 2003 
Sustainability and Risk 
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The requirement of a P3 to be sustainable over the contract period exposes the 
project to greater risk, especially considering the move towards entering into contracts of 
15 - 35 years. Risks are greater because the requirement to mitigate risk over a 
significant length of time decreases the level of certainty with which risk can be 
predicted. For example, while labour supply and demand can be reasonably predicted 
within a five year time frame, it is much more difficult to anticipate factors that may 
affect labour supply twenty years into the future . 
The requirement of a P3 to be sustainable for many years results in a greater 
likelihood that the risks identified and transferred at the onset of a P3 will change. 
Internal growth and development of the project and partnership may also require changes 
that affect policies, roles and responsibilities, governance, and restructuring needs of the 
project, all of which can result in project default if not properly managed. The very 
nature of a partnership involves risk such as turnover of key partners and/or roles of 
partners, as a result of each having their own interests and mandates which are 
susceptible to change over time. 
The indeterminable nature of future demand, revenues, political and economic 
climate, and social needs creates many challenges to accurate forecasting of risks 
involved in each project, the probability of which risks may occur, and mitigation 
methods and efforts that may be required. 
The identification, analysis, quantification and allocation of risks often proves to 
be the most controversial aspect in pursuing a P3, as each partner has a different 
perspective regarding time, risk, and decision-making. Though not specific to P3s, the 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) model offers a general framework for managing 
13 
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. . 
project risk and can be used as a guideline for identifying risks involved in a P3 project. 
Several Canadian P3 guidance documents such as Industry Canada's "P3 Public Sector 
Readiness Assessment Guide" ( 16) also offer general guidelines for identifying and 
assessing risk. Regardless of the method used, risk identification and assessment is a 
necessary step towards determining how risk should be transferred to ensure that value 
for money can be achieved. 
Risk Transfer and/or Sharing of Risk 
Once identified, project risks can be broadly classified into three categories: 
retained risk, transferable risk, and shared risk. 
Retained risk is that which the public partner is willing to accept, transferable risk 
is that which the public partner seeks to allocate to the private partner, and shared risk is 
that which is shared between both the public and the private party. As discussed, this 
transfer and/or sharing of risk is a primary motivator to engage in a P3 because it enables 
the transfer of risk mitigation responsibility to the partner best able to control, manage, 
and mitigate this risk leading to greater value for money. For example, the public sector 
may not have experience or expertise in managing the risks associated with changing 
technology, and to assume this risk would cost more than if the risk were mitigated by a 
partner who has considerable expertise in this area. For all partners involved, the 
objective of their investment is the achievement of a reasonable rate of return. With 
respect to the management of risk, the return gained by acceptance of this risk must 
adequately compensate for all mitigation efforts and costs. 
Table 4 displays a hypothetical example of the risk that may be shared or 
transferred in a P3 project. 
14 
15 
Table 4: Sample Risk Allocation Table 
PubliC 
• Regulatory/Political 
• Environmental 
• Tendering Process 
• Economic 
Development 
Sample Risk Allocation Table 
Shared 
• Injury/Damage 
• Force Majeure 
• Demand/Usage 
• Employee 
Relations 
• ProfiULoss 
• Technological 
Obsolescence 
Private 
• Development 
• Design 
• Construction 
• Operation 
• Maintenance 
• Inflation and Interest Rates 
• Exchange rate 
• Revenue 
• Taxation 
• Residual Value 
Source: Public Sector Readiness Assessment Guide, Industry Canada 
Determination of Risk Transfer 
Though it is not unheard of for a private partner to initiate a P3, this has not been 
the case in most Canadian P3 projects. The following discussion regarding risk transfer 
assumes that the public partner has initiated the P3, and is thus in the position of 
evaluating how much risk it wishes to transfer to the public partner, share with the public 
partner, or retain within the public sector. 
The determination of whether risk is transferable or should be retained by the 
public sector is based on an evaluation of the relative benefit/cost to the public and 
private partners. The mitigation of risk is costly, though these costs can be reduced if risk 
is borne by the partner best able to manage and mitigate the risk. If the risk is allocated 
to the wrong partner, costs can escalate unnecessarily. For example, if the private partner 
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is not accustomed to mitigating geotechnical risk, it will likely require a greater return 
(premium) in order to accept this risk. However, if the public partner has significant 
geotechnical experience, it may be able to mitigate this risk much more cost effectively. 
Therefore, if the geotechnical risk were to be transferred to . the private partner, the 
associated costs could escalate unnecessarily. The decision to retain risk is based on the 
same premise: it is retained if the public sector is best able to manage and mitigate the 
risk. 
Shared risk occurs when the public partner determines the base level of risk it is 
willing to assume, and allocates risk above that level to the private partner. In some 
cases, risk is shared when there is a perceived social and political responsibility placed 
upon the public sector, such as the protection of public safety. Risk may also be shared if 
it is determined that the risk cannot be controlled more effectively by one partner or the 
other, but rather through a combination of efforts. 
Ultimately, the goal of the P3 is to reduce the overall project risk by allocating 
risk to the partners best able to mitigate this risk, as achieving optimal risk allocation has 
a large impact on the P3 promise of value for money. Generally, the private sector is 
regarded as "having a greater ability to deliver more innovative products more quickly, 
with more flexibility, and at lower cost" (34). The Public Sector Comparator (38) refers 
to a UK survey of project managers across a number of sectors, which indicates that risk 
transfer is considered "a primary value for money driver in partnership projects". In this 
study, it was determined that efficient risk transfer provided approximately 60 per cent of 
total costs savings achieved through a P3 relationship. 
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Figure 3 illustrates the principle of optimal risk transfer: an efficient transfer of 
risk (indicated by the vertical dotted line), allows government to obtain the greatest value 
for money. However, if too much risk or the wrong risks are transferred to the private 
sector (indicated by portion of the line sloping down to the right), it may diminish the 
value for money that could be gained if these risks were retained (38). 
Figure 3: Principles of Optimal Risk Transfer 
\"a!~ for !onty 
Opnmal R.uk 
Transfer 
R.Jsk Allocauon 
Source: The Public Sector Comparator, A Canadian Best Practices Guide 2003 
There is still debate as to how much risk should be transferred from the public to 
the private sector in P3 partnerships (23) . The Canadian Guide to Public-Private 
Partnerships (22) states that m practice, risk allocation is influenced by policy 
considerations, public interest, and the negotiating ability of the parties involved. 
The combination of the P3 's promise to enhance the public's value for money, the 
requirement of both the project and partnership to be sustainable, the unregulated nature 
of P3s in Canada and the method of transferring risk to achieve efficiencies all leads to 
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the question of whether certain patterns of risk transfer have led to greater sustainability 
in P3s. 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Overview 
The suggestion that P3s create an environment for an optimal transfer of risk is 
pervasive in P3 literature, yet there is very little research available regarding the manner 
in which risk transfer impacts sustainability. Based on the literature review conducted, it 
is clear that sustainability is required in order for a P3 project to endure over what is 
commonly a 15-35 year contract period. Because of the long-term nature of P3 projects 
and the lack of a centralized regulatory framework in Canada, P3s are by nature exposed 
to a high level of risk. Since risk transfer has been noted to be a primary generator of the 
"value for money" attraction to the P3 structure, the question arises as to whether there is 
a pattern of risk transfer that leads to greater sustainability. 
The awareness of the various models that exist within the scope of P3s, the need 
for the partnership and the P3 project to be sustainable, and the way that the management 
of risk impacts sustainability, leads to the question of how risk transfer influences a P3 
project. Understanding that P3s in Canada have had various levels of success in terms of 
sustainability, is there a risk transfer model that leads to greater sustainability? 
19 
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Research Question 
"Is there an optimal model of risk transfer that can improve the sustainability of a P3" 
Premises 
1. Risk is inherent in all projects. 
2. The transfer and/or sharing of risk (ultimately reducing overall risk) is a primary 
motivator to engage in a P3 . 
3. The requirement of a P3 to be sustainable over long contract terms exposes the P3 
to greater risk than short-term projects. 
4. Not all P3s have been sustainable. 
DEFINING A RECOMMENDED RISK TRANSFER MODEL 
Overview 
Literature regarding P3s and risk transfer recommends passing risk to the partner 
who is best able to mitigate the risk. For example, construction risk should be transferred 
to the private partner if it is determined that the private partner has a greater ability to 
mitigate and control this risk. However, beyond this general guideline, Canadian 
literature regarding P3s and risk transfer is extremely limited, and the same is true 
regarding research from the United States. As a result, a recommended risk transfer 
model has been developed using material that articulates recommendations as per P3 
experiences in the United Kingdom and Australia. 
Among the materials used to develop a risk transfer model are the 2004 UK 
document entitled "The allocation of risk in PPP/PFI construction projects in the UK" 
(31 ), which recommends the preferred risk allocation in UK construction projects. In 
addition, a 2001 Partnerships Victoria (Australia) document entitled "Risk Allocation and 
Contractual Issues" (30) provided a risk matrix that identified risk allocation 
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recommendations to public partners. These recommendations are based on the preferred 
position of the government, and offer guidance to the public sector regarding how each of 
these risks may be best addressed while recognizing that each project has unique features 
(30). The Partnerships Victoria document was compiled using information and lessons 
gleaned from both UK and Australian P3 experiences, and the recommendations are 
meant to be generic enough to be applied to most industry sectors that become involved 
in P3 arrangements. 
Recognizing the shortage of risk transfer resources within Canada, and the 
experience and learning that the UK and Australia have gained due to their longer history 
with P3 arrangements, UK and Australian recommendations regarding risk transfer were 
used to establish a model for risk transfer. 
Scope of Risk Transfer Model 
Literature has been reviewed to collate recommendations regarding which partner 
should assume which type of risk. The range of risks identified for inclusion in the 
model has been limited to ensure a reasonable scope for this study, and to ensure the 
applicability of the recommendations considering the recent history of P3 development in 
the Canadian context. 
The four principle tasks in a P3 project are: 
1) defining and designing the project 
2) financing the capital costs of the project 
3) building the physical assets (if required) 
4) operating and maintaining the assets in order to deliver the product/service (34) 
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To develop a recommended model of risk transfer, the risks associated with the 
above principle tasks of a P3, and risks associated with technology were selected. These 
risks: design, construction, financing, operating, maintenance and technological, have 
been chosen due to similarities in their definitions across geographic boundaries, as well 
as the likelihood that a combination of these risks will occur in most P3 projects. 
Design Risk 
Design risk is the risk that the design of the facility is incapable of delivering the 
services at anticipated cost, or is not fit for its intended purposes and uses as specified in 
the project agreement (30). The consequences of this risk occurring are the possibility 
that service cannot be provided adequately or at all, and/or that the provision of services 
incurs higher costs than originally intended. For example, if a software project is 
designed to provide access to a designated number of databases, yet results in the 
capacity to access only 70% of these databases, the service cannot be provided as 
intended. 
The responsibility for design and the transfer of associated risks depends on the 
model of P3. In many situations, the parameters and specifications of design are 
determined by the public partner, and the private partner is required to complete the 
specifications of design within the guidelines set out by the public partner. In these 
situations, it is the responsibility of the private partner to design the project within the 
parameters and specifications that are given. Both Partnerships Victoria and Partnerships 
UK recommend that design risk be held fully by the private partner, provided that the 
public sector does not change the initial parameters and specifications during the design 
process. Should the public partner change these specifications, it is recommended that 
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the public partner assume the risks that are associated with these changes, such as delay 
and cost overruns. In general, public partner involvement in the design of the project 
should be limited to providing clear functional requirements for particular areas, in order 
to allow the private sector to determine how best to manage the risks involved. If the 
public sector imposes detailed obligations on the private party, "the risk allocation is 
jeopardized, as is the private party's ability to make decisions about how to best manage 
these risks (30)". 
Construction Risk 
Construction risk occurs when circumstances prevent the project from being 
constructed according to schedule, and on budgeted cost. The consequences of this risk 
occurring are delay of project construction, and construction costs that exceed the 
original estimates. For example, an increase in material costs can increase production 
costs, and environmental changes or a limited availability of supplies can result in 
construction delays. 
Generally, construction risk has been transferred to the private sector through use 
of fixed price, turnkey contracts (13). However, regardless of whether the contract is 
fixed price, it is still recommended that this risk be transferred completely to the private 
partner due to its experience, access to resources, and ability to control and mitigate this 
risk. The private partner is thus responsible for managing its own costs, constructing the 
project within the required time period, and for delivering all specifications and 
performance standards as per terms of the contract. Should the price of building 
materials increase, the private partner then assumes any additional costs incurred. In a 
situation where the reliability of equipment and materials is acknowledged to be new and 
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unproven, warranties and performance guarantees may be required of the private sector 
(30). In most cases, inflation risk is also assumed by the private partner, which is 
required to mitigate this risk through various hedging strategies. If neither the public nor 
private party is in the position to control or manage this risk effectively, and the risk 
cannot be transferred to a third-party such as an insurer, the risk should remain with the 
originator of the construction project (2). 
Financing Risk 
Financing risk is the risk that when "debt and/or equity is required by the private 
party for the project, it is not available in the amounts and on the conditions anticipated" 
(30). The consequence of this risk occurring is that the funding to complete the project or 
to progress through the stages of project development is not available. For example, if 
the private partner cannot secure the required financing as agreed upon, and the 
development of infrastructure is largely dependent on their capital investment, the project 
may cease development until further capital can be secured. 
This risk is commonly mitigated through financial guarantees such as 
performance bonds. Where the private partner supplies full or partial financial capital, 
the public partner usually requires guarantees and recourse financing to secure financing 
ability. However, it is also important to recognize that the financial contributions of each 
partner may change as the negotiation process evolves. For example, if the transfer of 
risk to the private sector requires payment of a significant premium to accept these risks, 
it may subsequently be difficult for the private partner to secure financial arrangements 
with lending institutions. As a result, they might not have the ability to provide capital 
funding as originally anticipated. However, once the financial contribution of the private 
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partner is fully confirmed and clarified in the terms of the contract, it is recommended 
that all financial risk be transferred to the private partner. 
• 
The private partner may also seek mitigation for risks associated with the public 
partner's inability to meet its financial obligations. Similar to the interests of the public ·: 
partner, the private partner is unlikely to invest significant time and resources into a . 
. 
project unless any required public funding is in place (13). The private partner can use 
similar mitigation strategies to ensure financial ability and commitment from the public 
partner. 
Operating Risk 
Operating risk is defined by Partnerships Victoria as "the risk that the private 
party is unable to provide the required operating services, becomes insolvent or is later 
found to be an improper person for involvement in the provision of these services, or 
financial demands on the private party or its sponsors exceed its or their financial 
capacity causing corporate failure". For example, performance standards may be below 
project specifications due to an inability to attract qualified employees, which then results 
in an unanticipated increase in labour costs and decreased quality of services. The 
consequence of this risk occurring is that service can no longer be provided by the private 
partner, or cannot be provided as per specifications set out by the public partner. 
Generally, this risk is somewhat mitigated through the competitive procurement ··~ 
process by requiring previous experience and financial stability guarantees. Performance ·: 
guarantees may also be embedded into the partnership agreement through the use of non-
financial evaluation criteria such as quality of service (30). 
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The recommended allocation is complete transfer of risk to the private partner 
with one exception: that risk associated with changes in output specification outside of 
the agreed upon specification range is assumed by the public partner (30). For example, 
if the service is not performed as per agreed upon specifications, the private partner 
assumes all responsibility for efforts required to mitigate this situation. However, should 
there be changes in the original specifications agreed to by the public partner, the risk 
associated with these changes should also be mitigated by the public sector. 
Maintenance Risk 
Maintenance risk is defined as "the risk that design and/or construction quality is 
inadequate resulting in higher than anticipated maintenance and refurbishment costs" 
(30). The consequences of this risk occurring is that cost increases over the life of the 
project are greater than originally anticipated, and depending upon the severity of 
maintenance required, that services are adversely affected. For example, if a court 
surface of a recreation complex gymnasium becomes unsafe and requires unanticipated 
repair, this would result in a disruption of services as well as unplanned cost overruns. 
It is also recommended to transfer maintenance risk completely to the private 
party (30). Typically, the private party will mitigate this risk through long-term 
subcontracts with qualified and experienced sub-contractors. 
Technological Risk 
Technological risk is defined as the risk of "the contracted service and its method 
of delivery not keeping pace, from a technological perspective, with competition and/or 
public requirements" (30). The consequence of this risk is ineffective and inefficient 
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service delivery which results in increased costs and/or loss of revenue to competitors. 
For example, a wastewater treatment plant may benefit from implementing a new control 
technology that though not required by regulation, could enhance the cost effectiveness 
of services they can offer. By not proceeding with the new control technology, they 
ignore potential cost-savings that may arise by implementing the technology. 
The recommended allocation of technology risk is quite similar to that of design, 
in which the private partner should assume all risk, barring regulatory changes, in which 
case the risk should be borne by the public partner. In the case where a contingency is 
anticipated, it is not uncommon for the public and private partner to contribute to a 
reserve fund to enable future anticipated technological enhancements. 
Links to Sustainability 
Design is linked to sustainability due to the requirement to meet specific 
functional requirements. Should the design not permit the construction of infrastructure 
or delivery of services as anticipated, the goals and intent of the project will not be 
realized. In addition, if the intended product or service cannot be realized, there are 
significant implications for projected operating revenues and expenses of the project. For 
example, if a toll highway intended to support a large flow of traffic is designed poorly 
and its capacity is reduced, projected revenues will also be reduced, thus negatively 
impacting the project's ability to meet associated financial, social, and economic 
demands. It is in the interest of the party assuming design risk to anticipate as best as 
possible, the future use and demand for the producUservice. While not necessarily a 
requirement of design as per the terms of the contract, this will enable the project to have 
some flexibility in terms of adapting to different future demand patterns, uses, and 
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amendments to the original design requirements, which could impact the level of 
sustainability of the project. 
Similar to design risk, construction risk is a critical component of risk 
management because it influences the future of the project. Proper construction enhances 
the ability to forecast future revenue or maintenance requirements, and impacts the ability 
of the project to expand or reduce operating requirements in the future. For these 
reasons, construction risk has a significant impact on the project's ability to be 
sustainable, as it provides a framework for future project development and maintenance. 
This link to sustainability is not strictly tangible; there are qualitative impacts that cannot 
necessarily be quantified. For example, in order for a project to be sustainable, both 
social and political support of the project must occur throughout the project's life. This 
places responsibility upon the private partner constructing the project to ensure that it 
meets the society's social and political requirements both in current and anticipated 
social/political climates. 
With respect to sustainability, financial risk clearly impacts the ability of a project 
to be developed, and to sustain itself over the duration of the contract. Where the private 
partner is involved in project operation, the ability to meet its debt obligations is based 
upon a projected revenue stream; later cash flows represent a significant proportion of the 
overall net present value and the calculation of value for money. In this situation, there is 
a built-in incentive for the private partner to provide operating requirements efficiently 
and effectively in order to meet their financial obligations. This is also a primary reason 
that P3 contracts are often found to be 20-30 years in length: the partners require this 
length of time period to generate anticipated returns. In this respect, it is clear that 
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financial risk has a significant impact on the sustainability of a P3 project, and the 
partnership. 
When private partners are also involved in the design, build, and operation of a 
P3, their return on equity may be based on operating revenues, thus cessation of service is 
a substantial risk if operating revenues are not realized. In this respect, operating risk 
presents a significant hurdle to sustainability. If the project does not provide the 
anticipated service, the project will not be sustainable. A significant strain on the 
partnership will likely result, provided the reason for cessation is within the private 
partner's control. To maximize the potential for sustainability, it is critical that operating 
performance standards are clearly articulated in order to prevent ambiguities and different 
interpretations between parties, and that future service demands are considered. If these 
standards are unclear, the public party may be locked into contracting a deficient level of 
service over a long contract term (30). 
As with construction risk, maintenance risk is linked to sustainability through the 
need of the project to provide the agreed upon services, and to do so in a timely and cost-
efficient manner. As infrastructure ages, the need for effective maintenance mitigation 
strategies also increases. The existence of long-term contracts provides incentive to the 
party assuming the maintenance risk to maintain the assets so they will last the duration 
of the contract if not longer, with minimal unanticipated cost. 
With respect to sustainability, technology can be a more critical in certain 
industry sectors than others. For example, if the project is a wastewater treatment 
facility, it can be reasonably anticipated that over the duration of a 20 to 30 year contract 
there will be significant regulatory, technological, environmental and capacity changes 
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that will require significant facility expansion and upgrades. In this situation, it would be 
likely that a reserve fund would be built into the terms of the contract to ensure 
provisions were made for these eventualities. Regardless, technological advancements 
occur rapidly, and over such long-term contracts a project must consider which partner is 
in the best position to manage this risk in order to maximize the sustainability of the 
project. 
Project Risk 
Design 
Construction 
Financing 
Operating 
Maintenance 
Table 5: A Recommended Risk Transfer Model 
Definition 
the risk that design of the facility is incapable of 
delivering the services at anticipated cost, or is not 
fit for its intended purposes and uses as specified in 
the project agreement 
the risk that events occur during construction which 
prevent the facility being delivered on time or on 
cost 
the risk that when debt and/or equity is required by 
the private partner for the project it is not available 
then and in the amounts and on the conditions 
anticipated 
the risk that the private partner is unable to provide 
the required operating services, becomes insolvent 
or is later found to be an improper person for 
involvement in the provision of these services, or 
financial demands on the private party or its 
sponsors exceed its or their financial capacity 
causing corporate failure 
the risk that design and/or construction quality is 
inadequate resulting in higher than anticipated 
maintenance and refurbishment costs 
Recommended 
Transfer to 
Private Sector 
Private partner except where the 
public partner mandates change 
outside of agreed upon 
specifications 
Private partner except where 
provision is specifically granted 
under the contract (ex. force 
majeure) 
Private Partner 
Private Partner 
Private Partner 
Technological risk of the contracted service and its method of Private partner except where 
delivery not keeping pace, from a technological contingency is anticipated and 
perspective, with competition and/or public the public partner agrees to 
requirements share risk by funding a reserve 
An adaptation from Partnerships Victoria, Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues, 2001 
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A Recommended Risk Transfer Model 
Table 5 is a recommended risk transfer model, which suggests the preferred 
allocation of risk transfer from the public sector's point of view. 
METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
To compare the risk transfer model to the method of risk transfer used by 
Canadian projects, data was collected via interviews with key informants associated with 
Canadian P3 projects. The 2001 CCPPP publication entitled "100 Projects: Selected 
Public-Private Partnerships Across Canada" (1) was used to generate key informant 
contact information. While there are numerous Canadian projects that have been initiated 
within the past 2-3 years, this resource provided the most comprehensive guide to 
projects that had been in existence since the mid 1990s, when P3s entered their "new" 
phase of development. Projects contacted were not limited in any way with respect to 
industry sector or type of infrastructure and/or service provided. Because this publication 
was 5 years old, many contact numbers were no longer valid, and alternate contacts could 
not be found. In some cases, key informants had retired and were not able to be 
contacted. 
Contact with 63 key informants was attempted. Successful contact was made 
with 38 key informants. Of these 38 contacts, 24 interviews were conducted for a return 
rate of 60.5%. One interview discussed a project that was still in initial negotiation 
stages: this interview was discounted leaving a total of 23 interviews considered valid. 
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Of the 23 valid interviews, 21 projects had sustained, and 2 projects had failed. Key 
informants were primarily public sector representatives who held various key positions in 
the development and ongoing management of the P3s in which they were involved. 
Participants represented many different sectors including waste management and 
wastewater treatment, healthcare, service delivery, information technology, ports & 
seaways, corrections, recreation, transportation, and education. In addition, participants 
represented projects located across Canadian Provinces: 
New Brunswick 2 
Nova Scotia 2 
Ontario 10 
Alberta 3 
British Columbia: 6 
A total of 12 different P3 models were described in the interviews, ranging from those 
which bundled two functions such as Operation & Maintenance, to models which 
bundled several functions such as Design, Build, Finance, Operate, Own, and Transfer. 
Interviews were semi-structured, conducted by telephone, and occurred in March 
2006. The length of each interview ranged between 16- 57 minutes. The purpose of the 
interviews was to collect information specific to the allocation and transfer of risk for 
each project. Informal semi-structured interviews were used to permit a greater degree of 
participation between the interviewer and participants, and to allow for a greater dialogue 
than independently completed surveys. This dialogue was also meant to trigger the 
memory of participants in the event that details regarding risk transfer might not have 
been easily accessible. In addition, the semi-structured format allowed participants to 
offer information regarding risk and sustainability, perhaps not included in the original 
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structure of the interview, but which were critical factors in their projects' development 
and sustainability. 
The following interview questions were used to guide the discussion regarding 
risk transfer and sustainability: 
• Why did the project become a P3? 
• Is the project still operating as a P3? 
• How did you identify the risks involved with the project? 
• Did you quantify the value of each risk? If so, how did you do this? 
• How did you determine which risks to transfer? 
• How did the transfer of risk contribute to the Project's "value for money" 
proposition? 
• How do you think risk transfer impacted the sustainability of the Project? 
• Has the allocation of risk changed at all since the initial contract was signed? 
• Are there any other comments that you have regarding possible links between risk 
transfer and the success/failure of a P3 project? 
These questions were chosen to understand the context in which risks were assessed, the 
basis upon which risk transfer was determined, and the impact of risk transfer on the 
project's sustainability. Participants were also asked to identify the amount of each risk 
transferred to the private sector using Table 6. This table was developed to acknowledge 
that risk can be shared between the public and private sector, and is not always fully 
transferred or retained. 
Public partners were contacted because the risk transfer model developed was 
based on literature that recommends risk transfer from the public perspective. However, 
if the public partner contact could not be reached an attempt was made to contact the 
private partner. In some cases however, private contact information was unavailable, and 
in other cases the research was directed back to the public partner. Two interviews were 
conducted with a private partner representative. In one case the interview was discounted 
due to the fact that the project is currently under negotiation and has not been finalized as 
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a P3 project. The other case has been included in the results, though primarily, the results 
reflect the perspective of the public partner. 
Table 6: Risk Allocation Table - Data Collection 
% Risk Transferred 
Project Risk Definition to Private Sector 
(out of 100%) 
Design the risk that design of the facility is incapable of delivering the services 
at anticipated cost, or is not fit for its intended purposes and uses as 
specified in the project agreement 
Construction the risk that events occur during construction which prevent the facility 
being delivered on time or on cost 
Financing the risk that when debt and/or equity is required by the private party for 
the project it is not available then and in the amounts and on the 
conditions anticipated 
Operating the risk that the private party is unable to provide the required operating 
services, becomes insolvent or is later found to be an improper person 
for involvement in the provision of these services, or financial demands 
on the private party or its sponsors exceed its or their financial capacity 
causing corporate failure 
Maintenance the risk that design and/or construction quality is inadequate resulting in 
higher than anticipated maintenance and refurbishment costs 
Technological risk of the contracted service and its method of delivery not keeping 
pace, from a technological perspective, with competition and/or public 
requirements 
Thus, the data collected is not representative of private sector feedback; the 
relationship between risk transfer and sustainability in the data collected represents 
primarily the views and opinions of the public partners involved, and not necessarily 
those of the private partners. 
All participants were provided with a letter that outlined the nature of the study, 
the use of information collected, and confidentiality assurances. Any concerns regarding 
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the study were addressed prior to commencing the interview. To ensure that no project 
could be identifiable, participant names, project names, and specific location remain 
confidential. All data collected was recorded by the researcher, and will be removed 
from her database at the end of April 2006. Participants were provided with the questions 
and risk allocation table prior to each interview being conducted, in order to facilitate a 
comprehensive discussion, and to minimize errors that could result from various 
interpretations of the risk definitions that may be used across Canada. 
The information collected from the interviews was used to analyze and compare 
the recommended risk transfer model to how risk has been transferred in Canadian 
projects. In addition, the data collected helped to identify any trends in the relationship 
between how risk has been transferred, and the sustainability of Canadian P3 projects. 
Limitations 
Legislative differences may impact the way P3s are structured in different 
provinces and municipalities, thus it is difficult to determine the influence of regulatory 
and legislative standards on the method of risk transfer. As previously mentioned, the 
study contacted primarily public sector representatives, therefore the data collected and 
analyzed is specific to the public partner perspective. 
Definitions of each risk were clarified to minimize errors m interpreting the 
meaning of each risk. However, it is likely that these definitions were still subject to 
some interpretation error due to the various meanings these terms may have held in 
individual project negotiations across Canada. 
Finally, the risks that comprise the recommended risk model were chosen due to 
the ability to apply these risks to many different models of P3s, and the generic nature of 
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their definitions. As a result, any interactions and influences between these and other 
risks have not been assessed. 
1. RESULTS 
Risk Transfer Model Comparison 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the data collection, and identifies the extent to 
which risk was completely transferred, retained, or shared in each project contacted. 
Given that the risks involved in each project differ, not all participants were able to 
comment regarding each risk. For example, an Operation & Maintenance P3 does not 
involve risk associated with design and construction. Thus, only those risks which apply 
to the type of contract received comment. 
The results indicate a tendency to follow the recommended risk transfer model 
with respect to design, construction, financing and operation, however this tendency 
moves somewhat further from the model with respect to maintenance and technology 
risk. 
Tables 8 and 9 summarize key information collected from the interviews. 
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Table 7: Risk Transfer Model Comparison- Data Collection 
Recommended Risk Transfer 
Project Risk Definition Model of Risk Results 
Transfer (based on 23 
interviews) 
Design the risk that design of the facility is 77 % transferred risk 
incapable of delivering the services at Private partner except completely to private 
anticipated cost, or is not fit for its where the public partner partner 
intended purposes and uses as specified mandates change outside 
in the project agreement of agreed upon 23% of projects shared 
specifications this risk 
Construction the risk that events occur during 
construction which prevent the facility Private partner except 71 % transferred risk 
being delivered on time or on cost where provision is completely to private 
specificall y granted under parnter 
the contract (ex. force 
majeure) 29% of projects shared 
this risk 
Financing the risk that when debt and/or equity is 73% transferred risk 
required by the private party for the Private Partner completely to private 
project it is not available then and in partner 
the amounts and on the conditions 
anticipated 27 % shared this risk 
Operating the risk that the private party is unable 
to provide the required services, 68 % transferred risk 
becomes insolvent or is later fou nd to Private Partner completely to private 
be an improper person for involvement partner 
in the provision of these services, or 
financial demands on the private party 32% shared this risk 
or its sponsors exceed its or their 
financial capacity causing corporate 
failure 
Maintenance the risk that design and/or construction 56% transferred risk 
quality is inadequate resulting in higher Private Partner completely to private 
than anticipated maintenance and partner 
refurbishment costs 
44% shared this risk 
Technological risk of the contracted service and its Private partner except 47% transferred risk 
method of delivery not keeping pace, where contingency is completely to private 
from a technological perspective, with anticipated and the public partner 
competition and/or public requirements partner agrees to share risk 
by funding a reserve 53% shared this risk 
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Identification of Risk 
Formal risk identification method 52% 
Informal risk identification method 26% 
No method of risk identification 22% 
A formal method of risk identification includes a process by which the services of 
a consultant, lawyer, or independent advisor were used to assist the public sector 
specifically with identifying the risks and mitigation options involved in a P3 project. 
Formal risk identification was initiated by the public sector, and was completed prior to 
entering into negotiations with the private partner. 
Informal risk identification includes discussion that arose as a result of common 
sense intuition or experience with traditional procurement processes that the partners 
brought to the negotiating table. For example, the traditional construction procurement 
contracts involve a fairly standardized risk evaluation, which though not formal in terms 
of the P3 context, does succeed in identifying some of the risk involved. Informal risk 
discussion also arose as negotiations evolved, rather than a specific intent to address risk. 
Participants who did not have a method for risk identification articulated several 
reasons for this occurrence: it simply wasn ' t discussed (though not out of intent to avoid 
discussion), there was not a clear understanding of what a P3 was and thus risk was not 
addressed, and because there was significant trust in the expertise and abilities of the 
partners, thus the risks involved were assumed to be common sense. 
A total of 78% of participants used some method of risk identification, whether 
formal or informal, including the two projects that failed. 
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Quantification of Risk 
Participants who attempted to quantify risk 30% 
Participants who did not attempt to quantify risk 70% 
Despite 78% of participants having some sort method in place to identify risk, few 
participants attempted to quantify the value of those risks. However, most participants 
made a distinction between risk that is quantifiable, and risk that is not. For example, 
though still a complex process, the calculation of costs associated with projected revenue, 
inflation, interest rates and financing requirements is far more straight-forward than the 
calculation of costs associated with regulatory or social changes. In situations where 
independent advisors were responsible for risk assessment, the participant was not aware 
of how the risk was quantified but was aware that an attempt at quantification was made. 
Participants who did attempt to quantify risk commented that there remained a 
distinction between the risk they successfully quantified, and risks which remained 
immeasurable such as social and political risk. Only one participant described an attempt 
to quantify all risks by using models from the UK to guide them through this process. In 
all cases where an attempt to quantify risk was made, the assistance of quantity 
surveyors, independent advisors and consultants was sought. 
Participants who did not attempt to quantify risk explained that risk they dealt 
with could not be valued in financial terms. Several participants commented that they 
based their assessment of risk on "a gut feel of whether it was a good deal". In one 
situation, the project's primary concern was ensuring the general public's satisfaction that 
public safety was preserved. Thus, this project evaluated this social risk in terms of 
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"priorities and impacts". Neither project that failed attempted to quantify risk, though 
each cited risk as a primary reason for project failure. 
Determination of Risk Transfer 
Based on expertise and ability of partners 22% 
Based on economic efficiency 22% 
Based on public stewardship expectations 9% 
Based on consultant recommendation 13% 
Unknown 34% 
While some participants articulated that risk was transferred to the partner who 
was believed to have the greatest expertise and ability to control the risk, others based 
their decision on economic efficiency: it was determined which partner could manage the 
risk at lowest cost, and risk was transferred to this person in order to increase the value 
for money proposition of the project. Stewardship expectation refers to the requirement 
that the risk is expected to be held by the public partner. For example, it was felt that 
public safety is a service the public sector is expected to provide, thus the basis of the 
decision to transfer risk was to ensure this expectation was met. 
The decision to transfer, retain or share risks varied with each project. Most 
participants articulated that various professional bodies had their own requirements and 
standards of operation and service, such as the College of Physicians and Surgeons, and 
other self-regulating professionals. These and other environmental and regulatory 
standards identified specific responsibilities that must be assumed by its members. 
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Contribution to Value for Money 
Risk transfer did contribute to the project's value for money 43 % 
Risk transfer did not contribute to the project's value for money 8% 
Unsure/unknown 49% 
Of participants who stated that risk transfer did contribute to the project's value 
for money, 60% articulated specific cost savings. In several cases, the cost of service 
provision did not require additional funding by the public partner, yet the public partner 
received social and political benefits as a result of significant improvements to service. 
In one particular situation, the participant explained that shortly after the partnership 
began, the project experienced a significant problem that required mitigation by the 
private sector as per the contract agreement. The mitigation efforts involved a substantial 
amount of capital investment. While the perspective of the private partner may have 
been different, from the public perspective this proved that risk allocation did contribute 
to the value for money, as the public partner did not incur any additional costs. 
Another example of costs savings described "significant cost savings over the 
life-cycle of the project" due to an unpredictable increase in market conditions. In this 
case, market prices rose drastically leading to increased energy and construction cost to 
the private partner. Because the requirement to mitigate this risk had been transferred 
completely to the private partner, the public partner did not incur any additional costs as a 
result of the market shift. 
In most situations where participants were unsure whether risk transfer 
contributed to the project's value for money proposition, they articulated that they had 
simply not addressed this question. 
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Impact on Sustainability 
Projects that remain P3s as at time of research 70% 
P3s that had completed their contract period 17% 
Completed projects that were not renewed as a P3 4% 
Failed P3 Projects 9% 
At the time when interviews were conducted, 70% of projects were currently 
operating as P3s. Many of these projects were at some stage of their initial contract 
period, though others had completed their contract period and were renewed as P3s. 
Projects that had completed their contract period were deemed successful because 
they had served their initial purpose, and there was no need for the project to be 
continued or renewed. For example, a software development P3 project was no longer 
required after the contract period because the terms of the partnership agreement had 
been met, and there were no further requirements for infrastructure or service provision. 
Although the initial terms of the contract were met, one project was not renewed 
as a P3 specifically because it was no longer suited to a P3 structure. In this situation, the 
public partner described a lack of incentive that would exist for the private partner, which 
would minimize the motivation to achieve efficiencies and thus decrease the project's 
potential to achieve value for money. 
Of all interviews conducted, only 2 projects were determined to be failures, as 
articulated by the participant. 
Risk transfer impacted sustainability 48% 
(Role of incentive 64%) 
(Role of revenue/demand risk 27%) 
Risk transfer had no impact on sustainability 22% 
Impact cannot be determined at this stage 30% 
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Participants who believe that risk transfer did have an impact on sustainability, 
consistently mentioned the role of incentive in enhancing the motivation to provide 
effective risk mitigation techniques. For example, the partnership of one project involved 
a user group who had a strong desire to protect their interests. This user group thus 
became involved in the project and thus had strong incentive to ensure that risks were 
effectively mitigated and service provision was of high quality and efficient. As a result, 
the project has been sustainable to date. 
Another participant described the incentive that occurs by linking the project tasks 
together. The private partner was responsible for designing, building, and operating a 
facility, and required operating revenues to be realized in order to meet their debt 
obligations. The private partner thus had great incentive to design and build the project 
as quickly and as efficiently as possible in order to begin generating revenues. Because 
the same private party was operating the facility, the quality of design and construction 
was not jeopardized, and high quality service provision was ensured. Others cited that 
while project services continue to be available, costs to the public sector have not 
increased resulting in greater potential for long-term sustainability and even growth. 
Technological changes and updates, for example, have been required to ensure adequate 
service provision, however in many situations these costs have been absorbed by the 
private partner. Had the public partner been required to finance these expenses, it would 
be unlikely that the services could have been provided at all, let alone at the expected 
level. 
Another trend that became obvious was the role that revenue and demand risk 
played on project sustainability, mentioned by 30% of participants who believe that risk 
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transfer did impact project sustainability. Each of these participants indicated that they 
had either underestimated the significance of this risk, or that their estimates of this risk 
had great impact on the project's ability to realize its projected return benefits to the 
partnership. For example, a conservative forecast of revenues ensured that the project 
would be financially viable, and when actual revenues materialized they were much 
greater than forecasted, allowing the partners to meet their debt obligations much more 
quickly. In turn, this minimized the risk of future financial difficulties. 
Both projects that failed stated very clearly that revenue risk was a critical factor 
in the demise of their projects. Both described a situation in which forecasted revenues 
weren't realized, which caused the risk of financial default to occur and ultimately, the 
cessation of service provision. In fact, unrealized revenue was the cause of both projects 
moving back to public ownership and operation. In each case the private partner was 
unable to meet its debt obligations or provide services at costs that were acceptable to the 
public. 
Participants who replied that the impact of risk transfer on sustainability could not 
yet be ascertained felt that impact on sustainability could best be evaluated once the 
contract period had been completed. At that time, a complete assessment of the project 
and risk mitigation efforts required could be made. The median length of the contract 
period was 18 years, yet the median length of the projects was only 7 years. Thus, on 
average the projects were still in the first half of their contract life at the time the 
interviews took place. 
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Changes to Risk Allocation 
No change in risk allocation since initial partnership agreement 76% 
Changes made in risk allocation since initial partnership agreement 24% 
Participants who have not changed risk allocation since the initial partnership 
agreements made few comments other than the obligation to adhere to the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and concern that the contract be reopened for negotiation. 
Despite the fact that the public partner may benefit from a change in risk allocation, the 
concern was that renegotiation opens the door for all partners to voice their concerns. 
This renegotiation process could negate the very intent of signing the contract and 
determining specific risk transfer arrangements. However, one participant brought up an 
interesting dilemma: whether the contract should be adhered to even adherence places 
undue pressure on the partnership. In this example, there were significant unanticipated 
market changes that were the contractual responsibility of the private partner. However, 
to hold the partner to the terms of the contract would likely jeopardize the health of the 
partnership relationship, and could result in consequences far worse than renegotiation of 
specific costs and risk allocation. In this sense, there was a need to balance the needs of 
the project with the needs of the partnership. 
The two projects that failed experienced significant risk allocation changes due to 
their complete assumption of ownership and operation of the project. Other participants 
who experienced a change in risk allocation discussed renegotiation processes that were 
provided for in the partnership agreement. Renegotiation processes were built into the 
contract to account for unforeseen circumstances such as distinct market changes ( eg. 
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increased utility costs), and increase in project scope (usually requested by the public 
partner). One project for example, experienced significant delays yet was able to 
mitigate the costs of these delays through renegotiation as per terms of the contract. 
When asked if concerned about the nature of the negotiations, one participant described 
that the contract is meant to be interpreted in the "spirit and meaning" of the agreement. 
General Comments 
Management of social and political risks is critical 44% 
Management of revenue/demand risk is critical 22% 
Incentive is critical in overall sustainability 30% 
Overall risk awareness in project management is increasing 26% 
Several recurring themes arose from general discussion with participants: the role 
of social and political risk, revenue/demand risk, the importance of incentives, and the 
nature and evolution of risk evaluation in any type of project assessment. 
Although actual risk may be transferred to the private sector, often the perception 
1s that the public sector remains in control of a project. For example, one project 
experienced delays in construction, and despite the responsibility for delays being fully 
held by the private partner, the tendency was to hold the public partner fully accountable. 
In this situation, the public partner decided to intervene in order to mitigate the potential 
political risks that could have put an end to the project's development. Another 
participant described a P3 project which was initiated shortly after a very visible 
community incident, thus the political and social sensitivity to service provision was 
extremely high. Mitigation of social and political risks required a highly-coordinated 
approach, and significant effort. 
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Several participants mentioned the importance of addressing social and political 
risks not only during the stages of project development, but prior to the project initiation. 
Without spending considerable time and effort mitigating social and political concerns, 
the project may be not pursued at all. For example, one participant described a pre-
commitment period of 7 years before social confidence was gained, after which time the 
project was pursued. 
There is often significant political risk held by the public sector, and these risks 
need to be weighed against quantifiable risks when determining project sustainability. 
For example, if public safety is a key element of service provision, the public partner may 
determine to retain that risk despite the potential for risk transfer would increase the value 
for money. Political risk can also arise due to regulations, as in the case of one project 
where in order for it to be pursued, the municipality was required by their community 
charter to guarantee the public sector's financial commitment to the project. Thus, 
inherent in the decision to pursue the project was a significant acceptance of political risk 
by the public partner. Another participant described a situation in which the P3 project 
was pursued strictly due to political pressure with no assessment of whether the project 
was best suited to a P3 structure. 
Incentive also plays a significant role in how participants felt risk transfer 
impacted sustainability. Incentives that are embedded by bundling various tasks are 
considered to be significant motivators for the private partner to meet the terms and 
conditions of the contract, and for bringing innovations and efficiencies to the project. 
As described earlier, if a partner requires operating revenue to meet its debt obligations, it 
will be more motivated to complete the design and construction efficiently and 
effectively in order to realize operating revenues as quickly as possible. In conjunction 
with penalties for delays and cost overruns, some participants articulated the need to also 
offer bonuses and other incentives if targets are exceeded. 
One participant described a project that required the private partner to develop a new data 
management technology. The private partner was given the advantage of collecting all 
revenues that could be made as a result of broader commercial applicability. This 
provided great incentive for the private partner to not only ensure that the technology was 
effectively designed and constructed, but also due to the potential to receive even greater 
returns on their investment. 
Finally, several participants mentioned the increasing level of awareness with 
respect to the role of risk assessment in project management. For example, there has 
been more focus on assessing and managing risk with the increased use of systems such 
as the Enterprise Risk Model, and various other risk assessment tools. This evolution of ' 
risk awareness is emphasized by the P3 structure because a P3 requires that realistic 
estimates of risk be made up front in order to assess the true life cycle costs of a project. 
One participant articulated the belief that this focus on risk assessment assists projects in 
determining whether they are suitable candidates for a P3 model. Several participants 
mentioned that their awareness and abilities in managing risk have increased with 
experience. In one case, a project experienced two failed RFPs, and by the time the third 
RFP was secured their identification, assessment, and determination of risk transfer was 
far more comprehensive than both previous RFPs, which they believed to be a critical 
factor in the project's sustainability to date. 
49 
7. DISCUSSION 
A literature review was completed to determine if a recommended model of risk 
transfer exists. This literature review focused on the compilation of data primarily from 
Partnerships Victoria (Australia) and UK sources because of the longer period of 
experience with P3s in those jurisdictions. These sources do establish a recommended 
risk model. This model was based on the public partner's preference for risk allocation, 
and with limited exceptions involves the complete transfer of each risk in the model to 
the private party. 
To determine whether the methods of risk transfer in Canada follow this model, 
information regarding risk and risk transfer was collected through contact with key senior 
personnel having involvement in a range of 23 Canadian P3 projects. These participants 
represented projects over ten industry sectors, and included projects that involved various 
levels of government. The information provided by the participants was collated and 
compared to the recommended risk transfer model. It was also used to identify how risk 
transfer occurs in Canadian P3 projects and to investigate whether or not certain patterns 
of risk transfer led to greater sustainability. 
The data collected through this research of Canadian P3s indicates that the 
primary reason for transferring risk is to capitalize on the private partner's efficiencies 
and expertise in mitigating risk. Thus, the method in which risk is transferred to the 
private partner is critical to achieving all anticipated efficiencies and cost savings. 
The information collected indicates that in those Canadian P3s, of the 23 projects 
there exist 15 different risk transfer models. Eight of the projects use risk transfer models 
which conform to the recommended risk transfer model. The remaining 15 projects 
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involve models which transfer less risk than the recommended model. No apparent 
pattern is observed between risk transfer, industry sector, and P3 model. For example, 
four Design/Build/Finance/Operate contracts transferred risk differently than one another 
despite operating within the same P3 model structure. This result points to the 
conclusion that risk transfer is determined on an individual project basis, requiring each 
project to carefully consider its own risk situation and to determine its own optimal level 
of risk transfer. 
The data also indicates that 78% of P3 projects studied have been sustainable. 
The two projects that failed did so because the private partner was unable to realize 
forecasted revenue, and as a result were no longer able to finance their debt obligations. 
These failed projects operated in different industry sectors, followed different P3 model 
structures, and differed from each other in their method of risk transfer. There were no 
similarities between the two projects that failed. Also, successful P3s were noted in the 
same industry sectors and type of P3 model as the two project failures. 
P3 projects in Canada are still very new, many being only one-third to one-half 
into the duration of their contracts. The results to date indicate that most projects have 
successfully endured to this point, regardless of the method of risk transfer involved. 
Data from 12 different P3 models has been collected, 11 of which have been 
associated with successful projects. This observation leads to the conclusion that the type 
of P3 model used has little impact on project sustainability. 
In addition to the data collected regarding risk transfer models, several other ideas 
and themes became apparent through the course of completing the interviews. 
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Social and political risks should not be undervalued or underestimated simply 
because they are difficult to quantify. In fact, these risks may be far more influential than 
anticipated, and require highly coordinated efforts to mitigate. 
Incentives also play a key role in a P3's contribution to value for money, and may 
play a key role in a project's sustainability. As one participant articulated, at the end of 
its contract period the P3 was not renewed because the incentive for the private partner to 
operate efficiently no longer existed. Thus, value for money would not be enhanced by 
continuing the project using a P3 structure. The ability of some projects to embed 
incentives into the contract appears to have enhanced their sustainability. 
The lack of a standardized approach to developing P3s, creates a need for expert 
knowledge and skills in order to improve the partnership's ability to address the unique 
characteristics and needs of each project. As previously identified, 78% of participants 
articulated that they used some form of risk identification in the process of establishing 
their project. However, only 52% of these people had a formal process in place. 
Considering how quickly P3s have developed in Canada over the past 10 years, the trend 
to bundle more project tasks and assign these tasks to a consortium of private partners is 
likely to continue. As the private sector increases its investment in P3 projects, the 
contract length is likely to remain high: between 15-35 years in order for the partners to 
achieve a return on their investment. This long contract duration will thus mean a greater 
exposure to risk, and a greater need to manage the risks effectively. 
While the results of this study do not make a distinct correlation between how risk 
is identified and the success or failure of a project, it was indicated that the length of the 
contract period may also play a significant role in project sustainability. Of participants 
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who had a formal method of risk identification in place, the median contract length was 
20 years. However, the median contract length was only 8 years for participants who 
identified risk through informal methods. This result suggests that long-term contracts 
require a more thorough evaluation of risk due to the inability to forecast risk accurately 
over a long period of time. 
The number of P3 projects in Canada is rising quickly. This will result in much 
closer scrutiny of P3s development, and the promise that P3s can provide value for 
money will be more closely evaluated. For this reason, it will be important to quantify 
risk wherever possible to enable the most accurate determination of whether true value 
for money can be achieved. Recent projects include substantial amounts of investment 
from both the public and private partners, such as hospitals, schools, and primary 
transportation links, and the general public will demand higher accountability and 
transparency surrounding value for money calculations. 
8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study did not find conclusive evidence that an optimal model of risk transfer 
exists within the Canadian context of P3s, nor did there appear to be a significant link 
between a particular model of risk transfer and sustainability. However, some 
conclusions and recommendations can be made. 
Canadian P3s transfer risk in many different ways, and many projects that involve 
different patterns of risk transfer have been sustainable. Also, risk allocation is not 
dependent upon the type of P3 model being used, and risk should be allocated to meet the 
demands of each individual project. 
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As the private sector continues to assume responsibility for more project tasks, 
there will be a greater requirement to assess, value, and determine allocation of risk, and 
to do so as effectively and as efficiently as possible in order to provide value for money. 
With the increase in number of P3s being initiated in Canada, a larger database 
will be established that will provide a much broader research base for future studies 
regarding the intricacies of P3s. 
Potential partners of P3s need to allocate risk on the basis of the best combined 
judgment of the partners, recognizing that the most appropriate risk allocation model 
appears to be project specific. Therefore, precedent projects can provide useful guidance, 
but should not be considered to be binding or limiting in any way. 
Based on the data collected, P3s in Canada are highly successful (78%) even in 
these initial years of experience. Therefore, public sector proponents of projects should 
proceed with confidence when considering the P3 approach to project/service delivery. 
Experience indicates that there is a higher risk to sustainability, where 
sustainability depends on long-term revenue flowing to the private sector. Therefore, 
when P3s are established particular care must be given to forecasting revenues to ensure 
that this risk is minimized. A formal risk assessment should be completed, with the 
assistance of those who are experienced and have expertise specific to the nature of the 
project. 
The longer the duration of the project term, the more likely it is that the agreement 
will require revision as time goes on. All renegotiations should be conducted in the spirit 
of the initial partnership agreement to ensure the sustainability of both the project and the 
partnership. 
54 
In summary, there does not appear to be an optimal model of risk transfer that 
leads to greater sustainability. Risk should be identified, valued, and transferred as per 
the demands of the context and unique characteristics of each individual project. 
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